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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last few years we have witnessed a progressive hardening of entry barriers to 
immigrants on the part of the developed countries. These measures have arisen in 
response to the new wave of immigration, one that has itself provoked a wide-ranging 
debate on the economic effects of immigration in the host countries. It has further 
resulted in the application of restrictive measures such as the implementation of  entry 
quotas
1, which have contributed to the segmentation of immigrants dependent upon 
whether or not they have the necessary valid documentation. Some immigrants, 
described as legal, go on to directly form part of the formal productive system. Others, 
considered as illegal, become part of the “hidden” or “black” economy (as, for example, 
carers for infants and the elderly, and as domestic workers, see Harazi and Sgro, 2003 
and Hillman and Weiss, 1999), with wages and working conditions that are habitually 
below those of the market. Illegal immigration is increasingly common and has now 
reached a significant scale: Coppel, Dumont and Visco (2001) have estimated that some 
500,000 illegal immigrants enter Europe each year.    
In response, a number of countries have chosen to restrict the number of legal 
immigrants in the economy; that is to say, they have established entry quotas by way of 
legal devices. This has led to the appearance of illegal immigration as an associate of its 
legal counterpart, thereby making clear the importance of drawing a distinction between 
both types of immigration. 
                                                 
1  There are many other types of immigration control policies, from amongst which we can cite those 
formulated in California’s Proposition 187, which excludes illegal immigrants from using public services, 
such as health or education, or those included in the immigration reforms introduced in the USA in 1986, 
which increased the penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants and strengthened frontier 
controls. However, in this paper we concentrate exclusively on the establishment of a legal immigration 
entry quota and on certain costs of illegal immigration in a generic sense.   4
The analysis of this phenomenon has been undertaken from different perspectives, some 
of which have focused exclusively on illegal immigration (Djajic, 1997, and Gaytán-
Fregoso and Lahiri, 2000). More recently, the discussion has concentrated on the effect 
of illegal immigration in terms of the welfare (Myers and Papageorgiou, 2002, Dolado, 
Goria and Ichino,1993, Braun 1993) or the salaries (Kemnitz, 2001) of the native 
population, or on the influence of such immigration when the labour market contains 
qualified and non-qualified work and the native workers appropriate a percentage of the 
product that is generated by illegal immigrants (Hazari and Sgro, 2003). Taking this 
perspective as a starting point, our paper considers the possible conflicts that might arise 
in given circumstances between heterogeneous workers when the government fixes a 
quota on legal immigration and when illegal immigration is also possible.   
It is clear that many factors exert an influence on the decision to emigrate: demographic 
pressure in underdeveloped countries, conflicts that threaten human rights, the fall in 
transport costs or the collapse of the Soviet block. However, in this paper we 
concentrate on the most commonly considered factor in studies related to immigration, 
namely the differential in productivity or in wages that exists between host countries 
and the countries of origin. Here we should recall that, as a general rule, a very 
significant part of migration is not channeled according to the rules in force and effect 
in the host countries. Rather, emigrants take their decisions in conditions of uncertainty 
and in the hope of finding a job and a legal status as resident, even on a temporary basis, 
in the host country, integrating themselves in the hidden economy until they have 
achieved their objective. Depending on the legislation of the host country, these 
individuals face the risk of detention and expulsion, although they can also eventually 
legalize their situation and form part of the labour force of that country. Of course, the 
costs associated with the transport and illegal entry to a country are an influential factor 
on the volume of illegal migration. The efficiency of the police and legal apparatus in 
discovering and expelling illegal workers can also have an effect. However, in this 
paper no attention is given to such questions, and we consider that the decision to 
emigrate, whether legally or illegally, only takes into account the wage differential. 
These wages are certain in the country of origin but only expected in the country of  5
destination, given that the wage actually achieved depends essentially on whether the 
immigrant integrates into the legal labour market or can only form part of the hidden 
economy, a situation that is unknown at the time of making the decision. Thus, the 
decision to emigrate is taken in an environment of uncertainty given that the manner of 
integration into the host economy in a priori unknown. The mechanism that seeks to 
represent the decision making process of the immigrant, described as self-selection, is 
taken from Faini (1996), in such a way that the final distribution of immigration 
between the legal and the illegal is endogenous. 
The existence of a wage differential between the labour carried out legally and that 
undertaken within the framework of the hidden economy would appear to be evident. 
The key question to be asked is: precisely who benefits from the difference?. A simple 
examination of some of the tasks carried out by these workers (domestic service, 
agricultural labour, small-scale building repairs) confirms that a quite significant 
percentage of the production that they generate is appropriated by the native workers 
who, as a consequence, benefit from the wage difference of these workers. In the light 
of this, we assume that the situation of illegality weakens the possibility of immigrants 
achieving the average wage and that it is the natives who benefit from this, in a way 
similar to that proposed in Hazari and Sgro, 2003. 
However, this is not the only effect of migration, given that the increase in the labour 
force affects the wages of the host country. This influence will depend on the type of 
labour that is contributed, that is to say, qualified or not, as well as on the interaction 
between the different types of work in the host economy. Additionally, if the individuals 
of the host country are heterogeneous, then the effects on some groups will be different 
from those felt by others. Therefore, one can easily foresee a conflict of interests with 
respect to the number of immigrants that each group is willing to admit and, for this 
reason, changes in entry quota policies will have different effects on the welfare of the 
different groups of native workers.  
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to consider the effect of an immigrant 
quota policy on both the relative proportion and the size of illegal immigration, as well  6
as on the welfare of different groups of residents of the host country, according to their 
qualifications. The literature in this regard, Dolado, Goria  and Ichino (1993), Braun 
(1993), finds a negative relationship between such immigration and the welfare of the 
native population in its totality. However, these papers do not take into account the 
positive aspects of immigration, such as the part of the production of these workers that 
reverts to the native themselves, and nor do they consider the distinct effects felt by 
different workers, depending on their qualifications. An alternative perspective is 
adopted in Myers and Papageorgiou (2002), who analyze the effects of limiting the 
entry of immigrants by imposing a “toll” or payment for obtaining a residence permit in 
the host country, which is then divided amongst the native workers, and where entry 
quotas are removed. That is to say, the idea is to produce a disincentive to immigration, 
with the wages of all the immigrants being reduced and divided between the native 
workers.  
In order to achieve the objective we have set for ourselves, we construct a model of 
overlapping generations which represents a host economy with natives that are 
heterogeneous in their qualifications and with a labour factor that is substitute amongst 
itself. The role of the State is limited to fixing a maximum immigration quota, 
expressed in terms of a percentage of the native population, although it is admitted that 
other immigrants participate in the economy of the host country in an illegal way, 
paying a percentage of their productivity to the natives under the concept of insertion 
into the labour market. This percentage can be interpreted as the cost of illegal 
immigration. 
The analytical framework adopted in this paper allows us to draw conclusions on the 
migration rate and its distribution between legal and illegal immigrants. We are also 
able to determine the effects on the welfare of the native workers in function of various 
key variables or parameters, such as the conditions in the country of origin, the costs of 
illegal immigration, or the immigration quota policy adopted by the State. The existence 
of heterogeneous individuals leads to conflicts of interest where a given policy measure 
will benefit one group of workers to the prejudice of others.    7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we construct a model, 
describe the agents that intervene in the economy and the institutional context in which 
they interact, and obtain the optimal conditions of the decentralized economy. In 
Section 3 we obtain the steady state of the economy and consider its dynamic 
properties. The relationship between entry quotas and the welfare of the different types 
of native workers is analyzed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 closes the paper with a 
review of the main conclusions. 
2. THE MODEL: BASIC ASSUMPTIONS. 
We consider a model of overlapping generations with aggregate production function of 
the Cobb-Douglas type, Yt = AK t
βLt
1−β, where Y is the product, A a scale parameter, K the 
physical capital and L is a measure of the effective labour of the economy.  We further 
consider qualified and unqualified labour as substitutes. Under the assumption of 
perfect competition in the factors markets and with k denoting the capital per unit of 
effective labour, the unitary retributions of effective labour and capital will be: 
ωt = (1−β)Akt
β   (1) 
(1+rt+1)=βAkt
−(1−β). (2) 
The agents present in this economy can be classified by reference to two criteria. The 
first, by their origin, which allows us to differentiate between natives and immigrants. 
The second, by their manner of integration in the labour market, which generates a dual 
differentiation. Amongst the natives, it allows us to distinguish between qualified and 
unqualified workers, depending upon whether or not they have decided to dedicate time 
to their training. Amongst the immigrants (who carry out all unqualified work), we can 
differentiate between legal and illegal workers, according to the way in which they have 
entered the host country. Thus, there are four types of workers which will be denoted by 
the index j = 1, 2, 3, 4, representing qualified natives, unqualified natives, legal 
immigrants and illegal immigrants, respectively.  8
All the individuals live for two periods. In the first they are endowed with one unit of 
time that they dedicate to work and, as appropriate, to education, obtaining wage 
income. In addition to the wage, each native worker receives a remuneration ρ  paid by 
the illegal immigrants for their integration into the informal market. The totality of 
incomes obtained, which we denote by wt(j), is dedicated to consumption and saving. 
In the second period, they consume with a charge on the saving of the earlier period. 
They all share the same utility function of the type Ut(j)= ln ct(j) [ ]+δln ct+1(j) [] , where 
j indicates the type of individual, ct and ct+1 are the consumptions of each period and 
δ<1 is the subjective inter-temporal discount rate. With st(j) representing the saving 
of the first period and rt+1 the interest rate, the inter-temporal restrictions for a 
representative individual of the class j will be: 
ct(j)= wt(j)− st(j) (3) 
ct+1(j)= (1+rt+1)st(j) (4) 
Let  Nt be the number of native individuals born in the period t (which, for simplicity, 
we normalize to 1 in t=0), and let us assume a constant vegetative growth at rate n on 
the total of the working population of the country, including in this the immigrants, who 
adopt the domestic fertility patterns.   
The only function of the State in this economy is to establish a maximum limit on the 
number of legal immigrants that it is willing to admit in each period. Such a limit, or 
quota, takes the form of a percentage φ of the total native population. 
The natives 
The native workers can integrate themselves into the labour market in two ways, that is 
to say, as qualified or unqualified workers. In order to acquire the status of qualified 
worker, the individuals must dedicate a fraction e ∈ 0,1 [ ) of their time in the first period 
of life to training. The qualification provides increases in productivity, in such a way 
that the unqualified workers have a productivity per unit of time that is a fraction q of 
that of the qualified workers which, for simplicity, normalize to one.  9
The individuals are heterogeneous as regards their innate ability to be trained. The 
heterogeneity of such training abilities takes the form of a uniform distribution of the 
time required for each individual to become qualified. We represent by G(.) the 
accumulated distribution function, in such a way that G(ˆ  e ) indicates the number of 
individuals who require a time less than ˆ  e  to become qualified. 
The individuals make the decision about their training taking into account the 
productivity gains that goes with it, as well as the cost in time of the investment in 
education, which will depend on the aptitudes of each individual. Thus, individuals with 
greater innate ability have to dedicate only a little time to education in order to obtain 
productivity gains during the rest of their working life. However, the gains derived from 
training decline as individuals with a lesser capacity, who must dedicate a larger share 
of their time to education to the detriment of productive work,  have access to that 
training. Therefore, there is an ability threshold level e*, for which the wages obtained 
as a qualified worker are equal to those obtained from unqualified work. As a 
consequence, only those individuals with an ability, measured as the time required to 
become qualified, equal to or less than e*, will dedicate resources to their training and, 
therefore, become qualified workers, so that the number of qualified workers  is given 
by G(e*). 
The income of the natives in the first period of life is made up of two parts: the wage 
incomes and the incomes they receive from the immigrants ( t ρω ). The latter, are 
identical for all native workers, but this is not the case with the wage retribution, which 
will be different depending on whether the work is carried out with or without 
qualification y, within this group, will depend inversely on the time that the worker has 
needed to dedicate to training. Thus, the income of a native worker will be: , whilst that 
of an unqualified worker will be:  [ ] ρ ω + = t t q w ) 2 (.  
For the ability threshold level, the retributions per unit of time for the work of the 
individual with a lower innate capacity who becomes qualified have to be equal to those 
of unqualified work. Given that the productivity of qualified work is one, the 
equilibrium condition can be written as 1− e*= q, from where e*=1−q.  10
The immigrants 
We start from the hypothesis that those who emigrate  do so as a consequence of the 
wage difference with their country of origin, in which the productivity of labour is a 
fraction p (<q) of that of the host country. They emigrate in their first period of life, 
without capital, and assuming the risk of not regularizing their situation in the host 
country. This obliges them to work as illegal immigrants, receiving only a fraction θ  of 
their productivity, given that the rest, 1−θ, has to be delivered to the native workers as 
a payment for their integration into the formal market. Therefore, 1-θ  is a parameter 
than reflects the implicit cost of emigrating as an illegal worker. 
With Mt representing the total number of immigrants of the period and mt = Mt /Nt the 
percentage they represent over the native population, the number of legal immigrants 
will come imposed by the entry quota established by the government, in such a way that 
the fraction of immigrants who enter as legal will be αt =φNt /M t. These immigrants 
will work as unqualified labour, independent of their training, with the same rights and 
obligations as the natives. The existence of a relative permeability of the frontiers 
allows for the entry of illegal immigrants who will represent a fraction αt
i =1−αt of the 
total number of immigrants. 
The wage retributions of a legal immigrant are similar to those of an unqualified worker 
and will be equal to his marginal productivity: thus, wt(3)= qωt. However, the 
retribution of the illegal immigrants will be: wt(4)=θqωt, with the resulting difference 
being divided in equal parts amongst the natives, such that  t
i q m ω θ α ρ ) 1 ( − = . 
All the immigrants adopt the domestic norms of fertility, preferences and abilities, and 
their descendants form part of the native population.   
The decision to emigrate is taken under conditions of uncertainty with respect to the 
manner in which work will be carried out in the host country. This decision will be 
made always provided that the expected income in the host country αtq+αt
iqθ  is  11
greater than that of the country of origin, p. In equilibrium both must coincide
2. 




  (5) 
  which does not depend on the migratory flow that is produced, given that each 
individual decides individually on whether or not to emigrate. From (5) and taking into 
account the definitions of m and α, we have that: 
m*=
φ q 1−θ [ ]
p−qθ
  (6) 
Expressions (5) and (6) represent the equilibrium values of m and α. Any other rates of 
migration or of legal immigration different from those of equilibrium generate forces 
that lead the agents to a situation of equilibrium. For example,  if α >α *, the 
perception of a high  probability of entering the country as legal immigrants leads to an 
increase in migration which, in the presence of an entry limit, causes the percentage of 
those who enter as legal immigrants to fall, until the equilibrium situation is reached. If, 
for example, m> m*, then the existence of the quota will reduce the probability of 
entry as a legal immigrant, which will, in turn, reduce the migration rate to m*. 
We can immediately appreciate that increases in the entry quota of legal immigrants 
does not change the fraction of those who enter illegally. In other words, attempts to 
slow down the presence of illegal immigrants by relaxing the barriers are inefficient, in 
that this leads to a “call effect” which tends to increase the total number of illegal 
immigrants in the country. 
The role played by the productivities of labour in the origin and host countries is as 
expected. Any improvement of productivity in the country of origin of the immigrants 
                                                 
2 In order for there to be finite emigration, it must hold that q≥p≥￿q  12
(increase of p) leads to a fall in the migration rate and, in turn, to an increase in the 
proportion of those that arrive in a legal way, thereby reducing the number of illegal 
immigrants who enter the host country. The opposite situation is produced when what 
improves is the productivity of unqualified labour in the host country (increase of q). In 
this case, the migration rate increases and there is a fall in the proportion of immigrants 
who come legally; that is to say, the host country is more attractive, which leads to a 
higher entry on the part of illegal immigrants if the entry quota fixed by the government 
is not extended.  
Finally, the fall in the implicit entry cost for illegal immigrants (1-θ) leads to an 
increase in the immigration rate and, in turn, increases the number of illegal immigrants 
who are incentivated by the improvement in their economic perceptions. 
In any event, emphasis should be placed on the fact that although the migration rate is 
not constant, the parameters on which it depends are. Total migration will increase as 
the number of natives increases, both as a result of their own vegetative growth and 
with the assimilation of the immigrants of the earlier period. 
3. THE STEADY STATE. 
In closing the model, we can obtain the rate of saving derived from the process of 
maximization of utility for each type of representative agent: 
st(j)= δ
1+δwt(j) (7) 
The aggregate saving of the economy in each period will be the sum of the savings of 
all the individuals in the economy. Where St(j), for j=1…4, the aggregate saving for 
each type of agent will be: 




ωt (1− e)+ (1−α*)m*(1−θ)q []
0
e*















ωt(1−α*)m*qθ ,   (8) 
The total effective labour of the economy is the sum of the effective labour contributed 
by each of the individuals. Thus, it is necessary to add the total time that each individual 
dedicates to work weighted by its corresponding productivity, taking into account that 
the illegal immigrants represent unqualified labour with productivity q and we establish 
the hypothesis that the management of the illegal labour carried out by the natives does 
not consume work time. Given that the variables which affect the migration and 
education decisions remain constant, it is sufficient to calculate the effective labour 
supply in the first period, given that in successive periods this will increase due both to 
vegetative growth and to the migration rate. Therefore: 
L0 = q 1−G(e*) [] +qm*+ (1− e)dG
0
e*
∫  y Lt =(1+m)
t(1+n)
tL0 (9) 
The aggregate capital stock of the economy will be the total of the aggregate saving of 
the earlier period; that is to say, Kt+1 = St(j)
j=1
4
∑ . Taking into account the saving 
expressions for each type of agents (8) as well as that of effective labour (9), we can 
obtain the capital per unit of effective labour:  




= + + + 1
) 1 *)( 1 ( 1  (10) 
Substituting in (10) expression (1) of the wage per unit of effective labour, we obtain 
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4. ENTRY QUOTAS AND WELFARE. 
On the basis of the model described above it is possible to evaluate the effects of entry 
quotas on the welfare of the different working groups of the resident population, using 
the income obtained by each one as the measurement of welfare
4. Here whe should note 
that, due to the heterogeneity of the qualified workers, it is necessary to specify the type 
of worker being referred to. For that purpose, we segment the native population into D 
groups, in such a way that the income obtained in the first period of life for each group 
will be  ρ ω + = d d z w , with  1 , , 0 − = D d K , where  * *) 1 ( e e z D
d
d + − =  is the result of 
multiplying the unitary productivity of labour by the fraction of time dedicated to that 
labour by the representative worker of the d-
th group . The case d=0 always corresponds 
to the unqualified worker. The case d=1, will represent the average qualified worker 
when D=2, or will be the representative of the first quintile in the distribution of 
abilities for the workers trained when D=5, or of the first decile if D=10. 
                                                 





k k k t t
t t dk dk , the steady state is stable. Given that when kt →0,  kt+1 →0 and 
the second derivative of the dynamic equation of the capital is negative, we can conclude that the steady 
state is unique. 
4 Given that the utility is proportional to the income.  15
The relationship between welfare and entry quotas allows us to conclude that there 
exists a minimum quota of welfare
























p q zd u ,   (13) 
which demonstrates that the quota threshold,  u φ , is greater when shorter is the time 
required to acquire the qualification. Or, put in another way, is increasing with the 
aptitude or ability for training. This allows us to represent the possibility of a situation 
of conflicts of interest between groups of workers with respect to the way the quota 
policy is handled by the government. The relationship between welfare and entry quota 
is shown in Figure 1 for the most simple case, where D=2 and, therefore, d=0 represents 
the unqualified worker, whilst d=1 indicates the average qualified worker. 
We can note three different scenarios or situations. In the first, characterized by 
) ( 0 z u φ φ < , increases in the quota above the established level leads to losses in the 
welfare of all the resident workers. The reason for this lies in the fact that the fall in 
wages brought about by the increase in migration is not counterbalanced by the current 
of income that has its origin in the management of illegal labour, due to the low valume 
of illegal migration. In the second, characterized by  ) ( 1 z u φ φ > , precisely the opposite 
occurs. Increases in the entry quota generate a “call effect” that leads to an increase in 
illegal immigration and the appropriation of part of the production that this generate 
compensates for the fall in wages, thereby increasing the welfare of both groups of 
workers. The thirds scenario, where  ) ( ) ( 1 0 z z u u φ φ φ < < , gives rise to a conflict of 
interests, in that an increase in the immigrant entry quota reduces the welfare of the 
average qualified worker and increases that of the unqualified worker, in such a way 
                                                 
5 For that value, it holds that  0 / = ∂ ∂ φ d w  and  0 /
2 2 > ∂ ∂ φ d w . The quota is positive always 
provided that  ) 1 /( β β − < − d z p q  is satisfied.  16
that the former will exert pressure for a reduction in the quota, whilst the latter will be 
interested in its increase. (See Appendix, Figure 1) 
 
The model has been calibrated, normalizing to 1 the technological parameter (A=1), 
assuming that there is no vegetative growth of the population (n=0). The elasticity of the 
physical capital (β) has been fixed at 0.36, as is usual in neoclassical growth models. 
The time preference parameter has been established at 0.4 and its choice is adapted from 
the work of Bouzahzah, De la Croix and Docquier (2002). For the parameters p, θ we 
have used 0.4 and 0.36, respectively. Finally, for the choice of the fraction of 
productivity of unqualified labour we have considered that university education 
supposes a maximum of 20% of the active life of an individual, in such a way that q has 
been fixed at 0.8. In this context, we have obtained threshold quotas of 7% and 13% for 
unqualified and qualified workers, respectively.   
The same scheme that we have described up to this point is reproduced when we 
compare different segments of qualification of the native population one with another. 
There are two elements that characterize the scheme. On the one hand, the least able 
individuals have a lower welfare, and therefore their welfare is situated below. The 
differences between the incomes of the most able and those of the workers that require 
more time to be trained will be greater when their productivity differential is greater 
(lower q), when the productivity of the country of origin is higher (greater p) or when 
there are bigger entry quotas. That is to say, establishing lower entry barriers for legal 
immigrants is an element of convergence in the incomes amongst natives, given that the 
call to illegal immigrants means that the weight of the wage income falls on the totality 
of incomes. On the other, we can analyze what happens when we increase the interval 
of quotas in which the conflict appears (third scenario), which supposes that an opening 
of frontiers benefits the least able to acquire training to the detriment of the more able. 
When our workers are more homogeneous (greater q), the tranche of quotas in which 
the conflict appears will be smaller. However, if we wish to reduce that tranche of  17
conflict, then the differential of productivity between the country of origin and that of 
the host country must increase. 
5. CONCLUSIONS. 
The conclusions that we can draw from this study can be divided into two 
blocks. The first makes reference to the effects associated with the entry of more or 
fewer immigrants and to the scale of illegal immigration. The second refers to the 
effects on the welfare of the natives which depends, amongst other things, on the 
conditions in the country of origin and the entry quota that is established. 
The main conclusions we obtain are that if there is a fall in the implicit cost to the entry 
of illegal immigrants, then the immigration resulting from the “contagious effect” will 
increase and, in turn, the number of illegal immigrants who enter will also increase. The 
same effect is produced in the circumstances where the State adopts the policy of 
opening the frontiers by increasing the level of legal entry quotas; in this case, 
immigration will increase and, paradoxically, the number of immigrants without proper 
entry papers will also increase, due, fundamentally, to the “call effect”. This effect 
arises because an increase in the quota supposes an increase in the probability of being 
hired as a legal immigrant, thereby affecting the decision to emigrate.  
When analyzing the effects in welfare, we can particularly note that a reduction in 
quotas is not always beneficial for the native workers. Furthermore, increasing the entry 
quotas provokes what we have described as the “call effect”, whereby the greater 
number of immigrants who can participate in the legal labour market acts as an 
incentive to a greater number of illegal immigrants. Additionally, we can observe that 
the effects of a change in the entry quotas are not homogeneous, given that they depend 
both on the type of worker being considered and on the conditions of the emigrants in 
their country of origin. In turn, this change in quotas is converted into an elements of 
convergence of divergence in the incomes of the natives. 
By way of example, two totally opposite measures that lead to an increase in the welfare 
of the natives are: 1) to reduce the entry quota to the country, that is to say, to establish  18
greater barriers to the entry of immigrants with high income wages in their country of 
origin, given that the quota established in such cases is located below the threshold 
quota; 2) whereas if their incomes in the country of origin are very low, then the 
measure to be applied is the contrary, that is to say, to increase the entry quota, given 
that we do not have a threshold quota. By contrast, only a fall in the entry quotas 
increases the welfare of the immigrants who are actually resident in the host country, 
independent of the wage they received in their country of origin. This leads to an 
interesting aspect, namely the analysis of the effects of country-specific entry quotas, a 
recommendation that can be deduced from this work. 
As regards the second block of conclusions, we have noted the existence of intervals or 
combinations of values of the parameters where an increase or decrease in the entry 
quotas have opposite effects on the different types of native worker. This question alerts 
us to the multiple effects of the phenomenon of immigration in a context which reflects 
these characteristics and, above all, the interest in discussing how decisions are made in 
this regard.  
In any event, a policy that essentially rests on entry quotas must take into account the 
questions considered in this paper, in which we have found that the effects can be 
contradictory depending upon the different types of workers who make-up the internal 
labour market. 
In closing, we would like to indicate some of the possibilities for extending this study. 
First, it might be interesting to analyze the effect of immigration on the effectiveness of 
the education system; that is to say, in making this process more costly in terms of time. 
Secondly, it would be worthwhile  to include an expensive control of the entry quotas, 
for which purpose we must define an appropriate tax system. Thirdly, we could 
introduce a penalty system for participating in the informal market. Finally, changing 
the system of dividing that part of the incomes generated by the illegal immigrants in 
function of the qualified acquired, or by the innate ability of the natives, might serve to 
enrich the analysis.  
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